Combinator Attack — Comprehensive Operation

Project reference document Time2Crack
Recipients: developers, security researchers, advanced users

Contents

  • Overview
  • Historical and academic background
  • Foundations: concatenation of probable tokens
  • Architecture of a modern combinator attack
  • Combinator vs passphrase robust
  • Implementation in Time2Crack: addCombinatorAttacks()
  • Keyspace combinator in Time2Crack
  • Calibration and prioritization
  • Benchmarks and orders of magnitude
  • Concrete examples
  • Combinator Attack Limits
  • Effective defences
  • References

  • 1. Overview

    The concatenous combinator attack of dictionary entries to produce compound candidates (mot1+mot2, sometimes with variants). It specifically targets short passphrases of common words.

    2. Historical and academic background

    Wordlists from leaks have shown that much of the short human passphrases rely on common words combined. Combinator engines have become standard bricks of hashcat campaigns.

    3. Foundations: concatenation of probable tokens

    If A and B are two sets of words, the nominal space is |A| * |B|The gain comes from probabilistic density: frequent human combinations are tested early.

    4. Architecture of a modern combinator attack

    1) Sélection de listes (mots courants, prénoms, contexte)
    2) Tri par fréquence
    3) Concaténation ordonnée (A+B, parfois B+A)
    4) Ajout optionnel de règles simples
    5) Test hash GPU

    5. Combinator vs. robust passphrase

    Two common concatenated words remain vulnerable.

    A robust passphrase combines several rare and uncorrelated words, ideally generated randomly.

    6. Implementation in Time2Crack: addCombinatorAttacks()

    Activation when:

  • or common,
  • or weak.
  • Category: cat: "combi", note: nPassphrase or nNotPassphrase.

    7. Keyspace combinator in Time2Crack

    The model uses COMBI_KEYSPACE and budgetTime(...), with specific branch for certain common cases.

    8. Calibration and prioritization

    In high fidelity, the combinator category is favoured when the passphrase structure is detected.

    9. Benchmarks and orders of magnitude

    On hash fast, frequent combinations can be tested very quickly.

    On slow KDF, the cost of each attempt slows down the attack but does not remove structural vulnerability.

    10. Practical examples

  • bluesky : Combinator presentation.
  • horsebattery : exposé so frequent words.
  • fjord-nectar-lotus-amber : clearly more resistant.
  • 11. Limitations of the Combinator Attack

  • low performance on non-lexical secrets,
  • dependence on original dictionaries,
  • yield decreasing on long and rare passphrases.
  • 12. Effective defences

  • Long passages of rare words.
  • Random generation via manager.
  • Modern KDF + MFA.
  • 13. References

  • Hashcat Wiki. https://hashcat.net/wiki/
  • Weir et al. (2009). IEEE S&P.
  • Recent literature on passphrases and probabilistic models (see Time2Crack docs).